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Abstract
We study the role of foreign-born workers in the growth of employment in STEM oc-
cupations since 1980. Given the importance of employment in these fields for research and
innovation, we consider their role in a model featuring endogenous non-routine-biased tech-
nical change. We use this model to quantify the impact of high-skilled immigration, and the
increasing tendency of such immigrants to work in innovation, on the pace of non-routine-
biased technical change, the polarization of employment opportunities, and the evolution of
wage inequality since 1980.
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1 Introduction
Immigration has constituted an important source of growth in high-skilled employment, inno-
vation, and productivity in the U.S. during the past 35 years. In this paper, we study the role
of this immigration in accounting for changes in the occupational-skill distribution and wage
inequality experienced during this time period.
There is a growing body of empirical work studying the labor market implications of high-
skilled immigration. Most of this work focuses on the impact on employment outcomes for other
high-skilled workers and specifically, whether there is “crowding-out” or displacement of the
native-born. Though methodological approaches differ across studies, a rough summary of the
literature is that there is mixed or little evidence that such displacement exists.1 However, as
noted by Kerr (2013), much less is known about the long-run and general equilibrium impacts
of high-skilled immigration on the U.S. labor market. The aim of this paper is to contribute on
this dimension, and provide a quantitative theoretic framework in which such questions can be
addressed.
The starting point of our analysis, as documented in Section 2 and by Hanson and Slaughter
(2016), is the fact that high-skilled immigrants represent a large and growing share of employ-
ment in STEM occupations—fields related to research, development, and innovation which are
key to productivity growth and technological progress. As such these high-skilled immigrants
and foreign-born innovators contribute disproportionately to U.S. growth. As we show in Sec-
tion 2, the likelihood of high-skilled immigrants to work in a STEM occupation has increased
over time, while this likelihood has remained essentially constant for the native-born. This dif-
ferential change is not due simply to differences in demographic change between native- and
foreign-born workers; rather, relative to native-born high-skilled workers, the foreign-born have
either experienced a much larger change in their propensity to work in STEM occupations con-
ditional on (observable) demographic characteristics, or there has been an important change in
unobservable characteristics of the foreign-born, or both.
During the same time of increased high-skilled immigration, the economy has experienced
technical change that is non-routine-biased, allowing technology to substitute for labor in per-
forming “routine tasks” during the past 35 years.2 Given this, we present in Section 3 a unified
1See Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010), Kerr and Lincoln (2010), and Peri et al. (2015). Kerr (2013) provides
a very useful overview of the literature on immigration, high-skilled labor markets, and innovation. In recent
work, Doran et al. (2016) finds evidence of crowding out among high-skilled workers at the firm level. It should
be noted that firm-level effects do not necessarily extend to the aggregate level that we are interested in here. See
also Borjas and Doran (2015) and Bound et al. (2015) for analyses of mathematicians and computer scientists,
respectively.
2While others have referred to this process as “routine-biased” technical change (see, for instance, Goos et al.
(2014) and Autor et al. (2015)), we depart from the literature and use the term non-routine-biased. This is in
keeping with the use of terminology in the literature on skill-biased technical change (see, for instance, Violante
(2008)), in which recent technological progress has benefited skilled (versus unskilled) workers. As argued here
and in the literature on job polarization (discussed below), recent technical change has benefited workers in
non-routine (versus routine) occupations.
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framework of endogenous non-routine-biased technical change (NBTC, hereafter) with both
native- and foreign-born workers. In the model workers face an occupational choice between
employment in production or innovation jobs. As such, NBTC is the outcome of purposeful ac-
tivity, namely the equilibrium allocation of workers to innovation. These elements of the model
provide a framework to simultaneously assess the general equilibrium implications of high-skilled
immigration and changes in occupational sorting documented in Section 2.
In Section 4, we discuss the calibration and quantitative specification of the model. We then
use the model to quantify the role of high-skilled immigration on non-routine-biased techni-
cal change, its associated polarization of employment opportunities, and the evolution of wage
inequality since 1980. We find that, contrary to expectation, high-skilled immigration has con-
tributed to a narrowing of wage inequality.
2 Empirical Facts
2.1 Immigration and High-Skilled Employment
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the foreign-born share of the population has more than
doubled between 1980 and 2010, from 6.2% to 12.9% (see Grieco et al. (2012)). As a result,
the foreign-born share of high-skilled employment has increased as well. In Table 1, we present
evidence of this using the 5% sample of the 1980 decennial census and the 1% sample of the 2010
American Community Survey (ACS), made available by IPUMS (see Ruggles et al. (2010)). We
restrict attention to the 20-64 year old (or “working age”) population. Given differences in the
questionnaire, we define high-skilled workers as those with at least four years of college in the
1980 census, and those with at least a Bachelor’s degree in the 2010 ACS.3
Evidently, high-skilled, foreign-born employment increased by 5.7 million workers during
this period. As a fraction of total high-skilled employment (in levels), the foreign-born share
increased from 7.8% in 1980 to 16.8% in 2010, mirroring the proportional increase in the overall
population. The bottom row of Column 1, Table 1 indicates that, of the total growth in high-
skilled employment, approximately 23% is accounted for by the foreign-born.
Among high-skilled workers, employment is concentrated within certain occupations. To
illustrate this, we adopt the classification system used in the job polarization literature that
documents changes in the occupational employment distribution since the 1980s (see, for in-
stance, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Cortes et al. (2015)). We delineate occupations along
two dimensions—“cognitive” versus “manual,” and “routine” versus “non-routine”—based on
the skill content of tasks performed on the job. The distinction between cognitive and manual
3For highly related results to those presented in this subsection and the next, see Hanson and Slaughter (2016)
who provide more detailed analysis disaggregated by educational attainment and occupation, analysis of wages
and earnings, and discussion on the H1-B visa program and means of entry.
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Table 1: High-Skilled Employment by Occupational Group
1. Total 2. NRC 3. STEM
1980 2010 1980 2010 1980 2010
foreign-born 1,368 7,061 951 4,948 172 1,063
native-born 16,283 34,973 11,933 25,256 1,238 2,653
foreign-born share
employment 0.078 0.168 0.074 0.164 0.122 0.286
employment growth 23.3% 23.1% 38.6%
Notes: Employment among 20-64 year olds with ≥ 4 years of college/bachelor’s degree, in thousands.
Data from 1980 Census and 2010 American Community Survey. See text for details.
jobs is based on the extent of mental versus physical activity. The distinction between routine
and non-routine occupations is based on the work of Autor et al. (2003). If the tasks involved
can be summarized as a set of specific activities accomplished by following well-defined instruc-
tions and procedures, the occupation is considered routine. If instead the job requires mental or
physical flexibility, problem-solving, or human interaction skills, the occupation is non-routine.
High-skilled employment is concentrated in non-routine cognitive (NRC) occupations. Not
surprisingly, these jobs occupy the upper tail of the occupational wage distribution (see, for
instance, Goos and Manning (2007) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). This is true of both
native- and foreign-born workers. The second set of columns of Table 1 display these employment
figures.4 Among the foreign-born, 951 ÷ 1368 = 69.5% of high-skilled individuals worked in a
non-routine cognitive occupation in 1980. This has held remarkably constant over time, at
70.1% in 2010. Similarly, approximately 72% of high-skilled native-born workers work in NRC
occupations in both 1980 and 2010.5
This occupational concentration, coupled with increasing immigration, implies that the
foreign-born share of non-routine cognitive employment has risen over time. This share increased
from 7.4% in 1980 to 16.4% in 2010, closely mirroring the proportional increase observed in high-
skilled employment and population. Of the total increase in non-routine cognitive employment,
approximately 23% is accounted for by the foreign-born.
While the sorting of high-skilled workers into non-routine cognitive occupations is similar
between the native- and foreign-born, sorting into jobs within this broad occupational group
differ in important ways. High-skilled foreign-born workers tend to work in occupations with
4In our analysis, non-routine cognitive jobs correspond to those under the categories of management, business
and financial operations, and professional occupations in the 2010 Standard Occupational Classification. See
Cortes et al. (2015) for a more detailed discussion, as well as how occupation codes are linked across the 1980
and 2010 classification systems.
5Perhaps unsurprisingly, the approximately 30% of the high-skilled not working in NRC jobs is concentrated
in the young. For instance, the fraction of 20-24 year old high-skilled workers employed in a non-routine cognitive
occupation is only 57%.
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a quantitative emphasis, whereas the native-born specialize in occupations emphasizing com-
munication and interpersonal skills (see, for instance, Chiswick and Taengnoi (2007), Hunt and
Gauthier-Loiselle (2010), and Peri and Sparber (2011)). This is evident in the native- and
foreign-born representation in the subset of non-routine cognitive occupations related to STEM
fields: science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, displayed in third set of columns of
Table 1.6
While the foreign-born accounted for 7.4% of employment in non-routine cognitive jobs in
1980, they represented 12.2% of employment in STEM occupations. In 2010, high-skilled foreign-
born workers account for 28.6% of STEM employment, an increase of a factor of approximately
2.5. Of the total increase in STEM employment in the U.S. between 1980 and 2010, approxi-
mately 39% is accounted for by the foreign-born (see also Kerr and Lincoln (2010)).7 Finally, as
discussed in the literature, such occupations are closely related to innovation, R&D, and thus,
technological progress; as such, high-skilled immigration has played an important role in the
output of these occupations as indicated by statistics on patenting, high-tech start-ups, and
other measures (see, for instance, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010), Hunt (2011), Peri (2012),
Kerr (2013), and the references therein).
2.2 Nativity Differences in STEM Employment
In this subsection, we take a closer look at occupational sorting among high-skilled workers. Our
interest is in the tendency to work in STEM occupations—how this differs between the native-
and foreign-born, and how this difference has changed over time. Panel A of Table 2 presents
the fraction of high-skilled workers who are employed in a STEM occupation; Panel B presents
the fraction, conditional on being employed in a non-routine cognitive occupation. The basic
data are taken from Table 1.
From the perspective of nativity, it is clear that the foreign-born are more likely to work in
STEM occupations than native-born. For instance, the fraction of high-skilled workers employed
in STEM is 5.0 percentage points greater in 1980 (12.6% versus 7.6%); similarly, conditional on
being a non-routine cognitive worker, the likelihood of being a STEM worker is 7.7 pp greater.
As a point of comparison, the tendency for high-skilled workers born in either India or China
to work in STEM is approximately three times that of the native-born.
Over time this difference has become more pronounced. Consider the tendency of the high-
skilled to work in STEM, conditional on either employment in any occupation, or in a non-routine
cognitive occupation. As the third column in Table 2 makes clear, this tendency has remained
essentially constant for the native-born between 1980 and 2010. By contrast, the fraction of
6In particular, we define STEM jobs as those listed under computer and mathematical, architecture and
engineering, and life and physical science occupations, a subset within the professional occupation category in the
2010 Standard Occupational Classification.
7Interestingly, about 21% of the total increase in STEM employment in the U.S. is accounted for by the source
countries of India and China alone.
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foreign-born workers in STEM has increased by 2.5 pp in Panel A, and 3.4 pp in Panel B. As
such, the foreign-born tendency toward STEM employment is now twice that of native-born
workers.8
This differential change in tendency is not due simply to differences in observable demo-
graphic change between native- and foreign-born workers. To see this, let piit be a dummy
variable that takes on the value of 1 if individual i works in a STEM occupation and 0 otherwise
(conditional on either employment or employment in a non-routine cognitive job). We consider
a simple linear probability model for working in STEM:
piit = Xitβ + it, (1)
for t ∈ {1980, 2010}. Here, Xit denotes standard demographic characteristics of individual i
that can be observed in the Census and ACS: age, gender, marital status, and an indicator
for whether the worker has greater than college education.9 The fractions of STEM workers
presented in the first two columns of Table 2 are simply the sample averages:
1
N
N∑
i
piit = pit. (2)
As such, the change in tendency reported in the third column of Table 2, pi2010 − pi1980, can
be decomposed into a component that is “explained” by differences in observables, and an
“unexplained” component owing to changes in coefficients, β, over time (see Oaxaca (1973) and
Blinder (1973)). We perform this Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition separately for the native- and
foreign-born samples.
The final column of Table 2 presents the estimated unexplained component.10 In all cases, the
unexplained component is greater than the actual, observed change.11 As a result, the changes
observed in the data are not due to the explained component. In addition, as with the observed
change in the third column, the native- and foreign-born differ in terms of the magnitude of
the unexplained effect. For instance, in Panel A the effect is an order of magnitude larger
for the foreign-born. Hence, relative to native-born high-skilled workers, the foreign-born have
either experienced a much larger change in their propensity to work in STEM occupations, or
there has been an important change in unobservable characteristics of the foreign-born, or both.
For instance, conditional on having at least a college education, the quality of an immigrants’
8See also Peri and Sparber (2011) who find that the occupational choice among native-born “job switchers”
is affected by the foreign-born worker share. This is consistent with our findings on differential trends in sorting
into STEM, and Kerr et al. (2013) who study the impact of skilled immigrants on the employment structures of
U.S. firm.
9That is, we control for whether the worker has 5+ years of college in the 1980 Census, and either a Master’s,
Professional, or Doctoral degree in 2010 the ACS.
10We implement this from a pooled regression over both time periods. Results in which coefficient estimates
are obtained for either the 1980 or 2010 period are essentially unchanged.
11This is due primarily to the fact that the explained component is dominated by the increasing female share
of high-skilled employment. Since men are more likely to work in STEM jobs, this change implies that the
contribution of the demographic change is negative.
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Table 2: High-Skilled Employment in STEM Occupations
1980 2010 change unexplained
A. per worker (%)
native-born 7.6 7.6 +0.0 +0.4
foreign-born 12.6 15.1 +2.5 +5.3
India & China 23.6 30.6 +7.0 +13.7
B. per NRC worker (%)
native-born 10.4 10.5 +0.1 +1.1
foreign-born 18.1 21.5 +3.4 +7.2
India & China 30.5 38.0 +7.5 +13.0
Notes: Employment among 20-64 year olds with ≥ 4 years of college/bachelor’s degree, in thousands.
Data from 1980 Census and 2010 American Community Survey. See text for details.
education, or their fields of study or college major may have changed (more than among the
native-born) over time. Unfortunately, this type of information is not available in the census.
Perhaps more importantly, the type of visa with which immigrants first entered the U.S. may
have changed since 1980. This is particularly relevant given the expansion of the H1-B visa
program (see Hunt (2011) for further discussion).
To summarize, the tendency of the foreign-born to work in STEM occupations has increased
since 1980, while the tendency of high-skilled native-born has not. Moreover, this relative
increase is unexplained by observable demographic change.
2.3 Non-Routine-Biased Technical Change
As discussed above, STEM occupations are those involved with R&D, innovation, and technical
change. We discuss in this subsection the fact that technical change since the 1980s as has
been non-routine-biased in nature. That is, in the past 30 years, advances in information
and communication technology, robotics, and automation, has allowed technology embodied
in machinery, equipment, and software to substitute for labor in performing routine tasks. A
growing body of literature documents the prevalence of non-routine-biased technical change
(NBTC) in the U.S., and other industrialized economies.12
This literature argues that NBTC resulted in a stark change in the occupational-skill dis-
tribution of employment. Industrialized economies have experienced job polarization: the labor
market has become polarized, with employment share shifting away from middle-skilled, routine
occupations, towards both the high- and low-skill tails of the distribution. To illustrate this,
12See, for instance, Autor et al. (2003), Violante (2008), Firpo et al. (2011), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Goos
et al. (2014), Levy and Murnane (2014), and Jaimovich and Siu (2015).
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Figure 1: Percent Change in Employment Shares by Occupation Group
Notes: Data from the Current Population Survey, BLS. See Jaimovich and Siu (2012) for details.
Figure 1 replicates a figure from Jaimovich and Siu (2012). Each bar represents the percent
change in an occupational group’s share of total employment. Over time, the share of em-
ployment in high-skill (non-routine cognitive) and low-skill (non-routine manual) jobs has been
growing. This has been accompanied by a hollowing out of the middle-skill, routine occupations.
In 1982, routine occupations accounted for approximately 56% of total employment; in 2012,
this share has fallen to 44%. Hence, according to this literature, NBTC has led to a polarization
in employment away from routine, middle-skill occupations toward non-routine cognitive and
manual jobs.
3 Model
Motivated by the findings of Section 2, we consider a simple model of endogenous NBTC. Non-
routine-biased technology is modeled as technology that is substitutable with routine labor in
production. Advances in this technology are the outcome of employment devoted to innovation
activities.
A key element to the model is occupational choice. There are two types of individuals in
the economy: low-skilled and high-skilled. Given the data presented in Section 2, high-skilled
individuals work in non-routine cognitive occupations. For the sake of exposition, we refer
8
to their choice as either working as innovators (in STEM occupations) in the production of
technology, or as managers (in other non-routine cognitive jobs) in the production of goods.
Low-skilled individuals choose to work in either routine or service occupations (both of which
produce goods).
In Section 4, we use this model to quantify the impact of high-skilled immigration, and the
increasing tendency of immigrants to work in innovation, on the pace of NBTC and labor market
outcomes.
3.1 Production
Industrial structure The model features three sectors of production. In the first sector,
perfectly competitive, price-taking firms produce gross output (Y ) using a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion in “managerial tasks” and “routine tasks.” Managerial tasks are derived from labor input
of managers, LM . Routine tasks are derived from routine labor input, LR, and automation
technology, A. Specifically:
Y = (zLM )
α[λAρ + (1− λ)(zLR)ρ](1−α)/ρ, ρ < 1. (3)
Here, z represents labor-augmenting technology, which grows exogenously at the rate g ≥ 0. By
contrast, growth in the automation technology is endogenous to purposeful innovation activities
as described below. The degree of substitutability between automation technology and routine
labor is governed by ρ: as ρ→ 1, the two factors approach perfect substitutes.
The input of automation technology is composed of intermediate goods, xi, with measure n,
and a fixed factor F¯ according to:13
A = F¯ 1−σ
∫ n
0
xσi di, 0 < σ < 1. (4)
We note that this specification of production is related to other work on non-routine-biased
technical change.14
The second sector produces intermediate goods, x. We consider a Romer (1990)-style model
in which growth is driven by innovation that expands the variety of intermediate inputs. We
assume that the innovator of a specific variety of input owns a permanent patent on the pro-
duction of its associated intermediate good. Each unit of intermediate good is produced with η
units of gross output.
In the third sector, perfectly competitive, price-taking firms produce output as a linear
function of labor input into service occupations: LS units of service labor input produce wSLS
13The fixed factor is included simply for technical reasons, namely, to ensure that production of Y is homogenous
of degree one in factor inputs LM , LR, F¯ , and xi for all i ∈ [0, n].
14See, for example, Jung and Mercenier (2014) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2015), as well as Caselli (2015)
who studies the effects of experience-biased technical change.
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units of output. Finally, to complete the description of production, we note that gross output
is either consumed or used as an input in the production of x.
Optimization Normalizing the price of output to one, the first-order conditions for profit
maximization in the first sector provide expressions for wage rates on managerial and routine
labor, the rental rate on the fixed factor, and the price of intermediate inputs, respectively:
wM = αY L
−1
M (5)
wR = (1− α)Y Ω(1− λ)zρLρ−1R (6)
r = (1− α)Y Ωλ(1− σ)F¯ (1−σ)ρ−1
[∫ n
0
xσi di
]ρ
(7)
pi = (1− α)Y ΩλF¯ (1−σ)ρ
[∫ n
0
xσi di
]ρ−1
σxσ−1i , (8)
where Ω = [λAρ + (1− λ)(zLR)ρ]−1.
In the intermediate goods sector, the per period profit earned by the innovator of input
variety i is pii = (pi − η)xi. Substituting in (8), the FOC is given by:
xi =
(
σΦ
η
) 1
1−σ
, (9)
where Φ = (1 − α)Y ΩλF¯ (1−σ)ρ [∫ n0 xσi di]ρ−1 σ. In a symmetric equilibrium, denote xi ≡ x for
all i. Substituting (9) into (8) and the definition of profit yields that the price is a constant
markup over marginal cost:
pi =
η
σ
≡ p, (10)
and that profits are given by:
pii = (1− σ)Φ
1
1−σ
(
σ
η
) σ
1−σ
≡ pi. (11)
In the third sector sector, given the linearity of the production function, optimizing behavior
implies that the productivity parameter in this sector, wS , is equal to the service occupation
wage. We assume that wS grows exogenously at the rate g.
Differential effects of NBTC Having characterized optimal demand for the various factors
of production, we note the following. The marginal product of routine labor (MPLR) is given
by the righthand side of (6). As such:
sgn
(
∂MPLR
∂A
)
= sgn (1− α− ρ) . (12)
Hence, an increase in automation technology shifts the “demand curve” for routine labor down
whenever ρ > 1− α. This condition captures the effect of the substitution between automation
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technology and routine labor, and the degree of the diminishing returns to the “routine tasks”
composite. To see this, consider the extreme case where production is linear in routine tasks,
i.e. α = 0: for every ρ < 1, an increase in A increases the marginal productivity of routine
labor. More generally, when the composite exhibits diminishing returns (when α > 0), there is
a smaller set of ρ values for which this is true.
Moreover, given the Cobb-Douglas functional form of (3), managerial labor and routine tasks
are complementary. Thus, we consider an economy where the effects of automation technology
growth are differential: all else equal, it decreases the marginal productivity of routine workers
while increasing the marginal productivity of managers, when ρ > 1− α.
3.2 Households
The economy is populated by a representative household. The household is composed of a
continuum of individuals, which we refer to as “workers.” Each worker supplies one unit of
labor inelastically. Within the household, native-born workers are of measure µnat, and foreign-
born are of measure µfor. There are two types of native-born workers: high-skilled and low-
skilled; we let φ denote the share of high-skilled native-born. For simplicity, given our interest
in high-skilled immigration, we assume that all foreign-born are high-skilled.
Low-skilled workers can be employed in either a routine occupation or a service occupation.
Low-skilled workers differ in their routine work ability, u, which is distributed Υ(u). By contrast,
they are identical in their service occupation ability, which we normalize to unity. Given the
date t wage per unit of (effective) routine labor, wRt, a worker with ability u earns u × wRt
employed in the routine occupation. Alternatively, workers earn wSt employed in the service
occupation, regardless of u. Hence, it is optimal for the household to allocate all low-skilled
workers with u < u∗t to employment in the service occupation, where:
u∗twRt = wSt. (13)
All workers with u ≥ u∗t are allocated to routine work. We denote slot = Υ(u∗t ) as the fraction
of low-skilled (native-born) workers employed in the service occupation.15
High-skilled workers work either as managers or innovators. While they are identical in their
ability as managers (which we normalize to unity), high-skilled workers differ in their innovation
ability, a. This ability is distributed Γ(a). For simplicity, we assume this is true of both the
native- and foreign-born. A native-born worker with ability a develops a× fnat × nt new ideas
15Note that we have specified workers as supplying labor inelastically; workers do not face a labor-leisure trade-
off, nor do they face the possibility of non-employment. As such, job polarization—generated by our experiments
in the following section—is a result of changes in occupational sorting among low-skilled workers. Any decline
in routine employment is reflected as a rise in the number of workers allocated to the service occupation. An
alternative, would be to introduce an explicit possibility of non-employment for low-skilled workers. See Cortes
et al. (2016) for a model of exogenous NBTC where workers choose between non-employment, employment in
service jobs, and employment in routine jobs.
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at date t, to which the innovator’s household is bestowed a permanent patent. Here, fnat > 0
is a productivity parameter, and nt represents the externality of the aggregate stock of ideas on
an individual’s innovative activity, as in Romer (1990). Similarly, a foreign-born worker with
ability a develops a× ffor × nt new ideas.
Alternatively, a high-skilled worker earns wMt employed as a manager, regardless of a. It
is optimal for the household to allocate all native-born high-skilled workers with a < anat∗t as
managers, where:
ζta
nat∗
t f
natnt = θtwMt. (14)
Here, ζt represents the shadow value to the household of an additional idea, and θt the shadow
value of an additional unit of income, both of which we derive below. Workers with a ≥ anat∗t
are allocated to innovation. Similarly, the foreign-born cut-off, afor∗t , is defined as the value that
satisfies:
ζta
for∗
t f
fornt = θtwMt. (15)
We denote shit = Γ(a
nat∗
t ) and s
for
t = Γ(a
for∗
t ) as the fraction of high-skilled native- and foreign-
born workers employed as managers, respectively.16
The household’s date τ problem is to maximize:
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τ
[ ∫ φµnat
0
log(Cit)di+
∫ µnat
φµnat
log(Cjt)dj +
∫ µnat+µfor
µnat
log(Ckt)dk
]
, (16)
subject to the budget constraint:∫ φµnat
0
Citdi+
∫ µnat
φµnat
Cjtdj +
∫ µnat+µfor
µnat
Cktdk +Bt+1 ≤ RtBt + rtF¯ +mtpit+
wMt
[
µnatφshit + µ
forsfort
]
+
[
wSts
lo
t + wRt
∫ ∞
u∗t
u dΥ(u)
]
µnat(1− φ),
(17)
and the law-of-motion for the household’s stock of patents:
mt+1 = mt + nt
[
µnatφfnat
∫ ∞
anat∗t
a dΓ(a) + µforffor
∫ ∞
afor∗t
a dΓ(a)
]
, (18)
for all t ≥ τ . In equation (17), Bt+1 denotes one-period bonds purchased at date t that pay a
return of Rt+1 at date t+1.
17 Rental income on the household’s fixed factor is given by rtF¯ . The
second line of (17) denotes household labor income earned by workers in management, service,
and routine employment.
16Given that Γ(a) is identical across nativity, fnat 6= ffor allows the model to generate differences in occupa-
tional sorting across high-skilled native- and foreign-born workers; this is made explicit via equation (29) below.
An alternative would be to allow the distributions to differ by nativity.
17In equilibrium, such bonds are in zero net supply, and simply allow us to designate the household’s discount
factor in the derivations to follow.
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At date t, the household’s stock of ideas is mt. With symmetry, each idea earns flow profit
pit. Patents do not expire or depreciate, so that (18) indicates that mt+1 is simply the stock
today augmented by new ideas developed by high-skilled workers at date t.18
Let θt and ζt denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the date t budget constraint
(17) and law-of-motion (18), respectively. Given preferences, optimality involves allocating
the same consumption level to all workers, regardless of nativity, skill, or occupation: Cit =
Cjt = Ckt = Ct, ∀i, j, k. As such, our model is suited to the analysis of changes in wage and
income inequality; it is not suited to analyzing consumption or welfare inequality.19 Moreover,
optimality implies θt = 1/Ct. The FOC for bond holding is:
θt = βθt+1Rt+1. (19)
The FOC for the household’s stock of ideas is given by:
ζt = βζt+1 + βθt+1pit+1. (20)
Iterating forward, this becomes:
ζt = βθt+1pit+1 + β
2θt+2pit+2 + β
3θt+3pit+3 + . . . (21)
Dividing by θt and using (19), obtains:
ζt
θt
=
pit+1
Rt+1
+
pit+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
pit+3
Rt+1Rt+2Rt+3
+ . . . (22)
As a result, the cut-off condition (14) can be rewritten as:
wMt = a
nat∗
t f
natnt
∞∑
i=1
[
pit+i∏i
j=1Rt+j
]
. (23)
That is, occupational choice among high-skilled natives is such that, at anat∗t , the return to
working as a manager (in terms of current wage income) is equated to the present value of
future profit that worker would generate from innovation. Obviously, (15) can be rewritten in
the analogous way, with afor∗t ffor replacing anat∗t fnat above.
3.3 Equilibrium and Balanced Growth
Equilibrium in this model is defined in the usual way. Optimization on the part of firms is
summarized by the FOCs (5) through (9). Household optimization is summarized by (13)
through (15), and (17) holding with equality.
18For simplicity, we have assumed that patents do not depreciate. Instead, one could assume that patents
depreciate at a constant rate δ. This would introduce an additional parameter to calibrate, but importantly,
would not qualitatively change the nature of our analysis or results.
19Addressing these latter issues would require the explicit modelling of heterogeneous agents, and tracking the
distribution of capital and savings as aggregate state variables. Doing so would muddle the analysis of occupational
employment and wage outcomes that are of primary concern, and is therefore beyond the scope of this paper.
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Since bonds are in zero net supply, Bt = 0. Labor market clearing requires:
LSt = µ
nat(1− φ)slot , (24)
LRt = µ
nat(1− φ)
∫ ∞
u∗t
u dΥ(u), (25)
LMt = µ
natφshit + µ
forsfort . (26)
In the ideas market, mt = nt. Using (18), this implies that the growth rate of the aggregate
stock of ideas is given by:
gnt+1 =
nt+1 − nt
nt
= µnatφfnat
∫ ∞
anat∗t
a dΓ(a) + µforffor
∫ ∞
afor∗t
a dΓ(a). (27)
Finally, the household budget constraint can be used to derive the aggregate resource constraint:
(µnat + µfor)Ct = Yt + wStLSt − ηxtnt. (28)
Equation (27) allows us to consider the determinants of the growth of ideas, i.e. non-routine-
biased technical change. For instance, an increase in the productivity of innovation, either
fnat or ffor, has a direct effect of increasing gn. In addition, such a change has an effect on
occupational choice: the more productive is innovation, the lower is the threshold productivity
(anat∗ and afor∗) required to equate returns to managerial work and innovation in (14) and (15),
all else equal. Hence, increases in fnat and ffor have an equilibrium effect of inducing greater
resources devoted to innovation that reinforce the direct effect.
In addition, increases in the high-skilled population, either µnatφ or µfor, increase NBTC.
That is, our model displays a version of the “scale effect” on growth shared by Romer (1990)-
style models; here, the scale effect is in terms of the measure of high-skilled workers (as opposed
to total population per se).
Finally, note that changes in the composition of high-skilled workers affect gn when anat∗ 6=
afor∗. From equations (14) and (15), it is easy to see that:
anat∗t
afor∗t
=
ffor
fnat
. (29)
Suppose, for instance, that ffor > fnat so anat∗ > afor∗; given that the distribution, Γ, is
identical across nativity, this implies that sorting into the innovation occupation is greater
among the foreign-born. In this case, a compositional shift toward more foreign-born workers
that leaves the total measure of high-skilled workers unchanged has the effect of increasing the
growth rate of ideas.
Given this discussion and the characterization of equilibrium, it is possible to consider bal-
anced growth in our economy. In particular, the model admits a balanced growth path (BGP,
hereafter) in which labor allocations are constant (u∗t = u∗, anat∗t = anat∗, and a
for∗
t = a
for∗),
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and the stock of ideas (nt), labor-augmenting technology (zt), and the service occupation wage
(wSt) all grow at the same, constant rate (g
n
t+1 = g
n = g). It is straightforward to show that
along such a BGP: the service flow (xt) and profit (pit) from each idea is constant; the gross
real interest rate (Rt) is constant; and automation technology (At), wages (wSt, wRt, wMt), and
consumption (Ct) grow at rate g.
4 Quantitative Results
4.1 Calibration and Parameter Specification
In this subsection, we discuss how to quantify the model economy to a BGP. This is meant to
represent the U.S. economy prior to the onset of job polarization. We view the past 35 years as
a period of “unbalanced” growth, characterized by a declining share of employment in routine
occupations due to NBTC; we defer discussion of unbalanced growth/NBTC to subsection 4.2.
There are 14 parameters that need to be specified. To maintain comparability to the liter-
ature, we perform a standard calibration when possible. The initial BGP is calibrated to the
U.S. in 1980.
First we normalize η = 1 and F¯ = 1. We then set the BGP growth rate of the technology
variables (n, z, and wS) to 2% per year. To accord with an annual risk-free rate of 4.6%, we
set β = 0.975. We set the nativity and skill shares of the employed population to match those
observed in the 1980 Census. Normalizing µnat + µfor = 1, we set µfor = 0.0137 to accord with
the fraction of high-skilled, foreign-born workers in the economy. Of the native-born, φ = 0.17
specifies the split between high- and low-skilled workers.
To match the fat right-tail of returns to innovation and entrepreneurial activity observed in
U.S. data, we specify the Γ(a) distribution to be Pareto. This has the computational advantage
of introducing only one calibration target, namely the shape parameter, which we denote κ.20
Recall that we restrict the innovation ability distributions to be identical across the native- and
foreign-born. As a result, nativity differences in sorting across innovation and managerial em-
ployment are reflected in the productivity parameters fnat and ffor. For the sake of consistency,
we specify Υ(u) to also be Pareto, with corresponding shape parameter ν.
Given this, we jointly calibrate the following six parameters: the production share parameters
α and λ, the shape parameters ν and κ, and the innovation productivity parameters fnat and
ffor as follows. In order to identify these we specify that along the BGP, the model matches the
following six moments from the 1980 census data. First, we match three “quantity moments.”
Given the results of Section 2, we calibrate the BGP values shi = 0.896 and sfor = 0.819 to
match the fraction of non-routine cognitive workers in managerial (i.e. non-STEM) occupations,
20The location parameter of the Pareto distribution is simply a normalization relative to fnat and ffor, for the
purposes of calibration.
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for the native- and foreign-born, respectively. We set slo = 0.2 to match the fraction of low-
skilled workers that work in service (i.e. non-routine manual) occupations. The remaining three
moments relate to prices: (i) a share of total labor income paid to low-skilled (routine and
service) labor of 47%, (ii) a median routine-to-service occupation wage ratio of 1.75, and (iii) a
median managerial-to-routine occupation wage ratio of 1.6.
This leaves the two elasticity parameters in production to be specified. Given the nature of
our results, we set ρ = 0.995. That is, we set the elasticity of substitution between automation
technology and routine labor as close to infinite as (computationally) possible; this allows the
model to maximize the negative effect of increased innovation and NBTC on the demand for
routine labor. Finally, we set σ = 0.5. In numerical experiments, we find that our results are
extremely robust to the choice of this parameter.
4.2 Nature of the Experiments
As discussed above, the period since 1980 is not well characterized as displaying balanced growth.
The phenomenon of job polarization has meant that employment allocations have not been
constant: the share of employment in routine occupations has been falling, while the shares in
non-routine cognitive and service occupations has been rising. Moreover, inequality between
high- and low-skill wages has increased; more recently, routine and service occupation wages
have converged (see Acemoglu and Autor (2011).)
From the perspective of the model, the past 35 years has been a period of unbalanced growth.
In particular, NBTC and the accumulation of automation technology has led to a inward shift in
the demand for routine labor, and an outward shift in the demand for high-skilled labor, all else
equal. Moreover, rising educational attainment has meant a shift in the composition of labor
supply toward high-skilled workers, and immigration policy has led to a rise in the foreign-born
share of the high-skilled population.
As such, we conduct a series of quantitative experiments in the model to isolate the role of
immigration for the evolution of the economy during this unbalanced growth period. In our
experiments we assume the economy was on a BGP in 1980 and then hit by a number of shocks
that we specify below. After the arrival of the shocks, we track the perfect foresight transition
path of the economy to a new BGP. We specify that the economy arrives at the new BGP in
the year 2070, 90 years after the arrival period of the shock.21
Specifically, we assume that in 1980 the economy is hit with two shocks. First, we allow the
21In principle, the results of the experiment depend on the “terminal date” at which the new BGP is attained,
since agents in the model operate with perfect foresight. However, in experiments not reported here, we find that
the results for the transition path are incredibly insensitive to the choice of this date. For instance, when we set
the terminal date to 2010, the results for the period of interest—1980 to 2010—are surprisingly similar to the
case reported here, with the terminal date set to 2070. We specify a 90 year transition period in the baseline
experiment in order to better understand the model’s implications for the “very long run;” see Section 4.4 for
further discussion.
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fraction µfor to increase at a constant rate; this growth is specified so that after 30 years of
growth, the fraction of high-skilled, foreign-born workers matches that observed in 2010 in the
U.S. data. Given that the high-skilled can select into innovation, this increase alone accelerates
the growth of automation technology that substitutes for routine labor input.
But as reported in the bottom panel of Table 2, the tendency of high-skilled, foreign-born
workers to work in innovation occupations increased between 1980 and 2010. As discussed
in Section 2, this represents either a true “propensity” change or a change in the unobserved
characteristics of foreign-born workers. Hence, we also allow for a one-time increase in the inno-
vation productivity, ffor, that causes foreign-born workers to sort more heavily into innovation
as opposed to managerial labor that replicates the changes observed in Table 2.22
As discussed in subsection 3.3, these two changes (increasing µfor and ffor) increase the
number of innovators in the economy, and results in an endogenous rise in the growth rate of
ideas. Our experiment causes gn to rise while leaving the growth rates of labor-augmenting
productivity (z) and the service occupation productivity (wS) unchanged at their previous BGP
value. The new BGP is attained in 2070 when the growth rates of z and wS make a one-time
increase from g to the endogenously determined value of gn in that period. From 2070 onward,
µfor becomes constant.
4.3 Results
Figure 2 presents the foreign-born population share for the period 1980 to 2010. In all figures, the
red dashed line indicates the time series under the original BGP, while the blue line represents
the immigration experiment detailed in the previous subsection. By construction, the values for
1980 and 2010 along the experiment’s transition path correspond with the values observed in the
1980 Census and 2010 ACS data, representing a four-fold increase. Recall that the foreign-born
population in the model represents only foreign-born, high-skilled employment.
In the upper-left panel of Figure 3, we present the fraction of high-skilled workers who sort
into innovation (1 − sfor) among the foreign-born. By construction, this increases as observed
in the U.S. data, due to the increase in foreign-born innovation productivity. The upper-right
panel presents the same variable for the native-born. In response to the increase in the number
of foreign-born innovators, the fraction of native-born who sort into innovation falls.
Though this effect on native-born innovation is quantitatively small, it is instructive to
understand the force generating it. Native sorting into innovation falls, despite production of
new ideas being linear in the number of innovators; that is, the fall occurs despite innovation
22Note that other changes that cause greater equilibrium sorting of the foreign-born into innovation in equi-
librium are equivalent to increasing ffor. For instance, one could argue that the unobservable characteristics of
the foreign-born have changed over time due to the H1-B visa. This might be reflected as a rightward shift of
the distribution, Γ(a), of innovation ability of the foreign-born relative to natives. But given our specification of
production in innovation, a × f × nt, allowing for a change in the location parameter of the Pareto distribution
for the foreign-born is isomorphic to changing the productivity parameter, ffor.
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Figure 2: High-Skilled Immigration Experiment
Notes: The red dashed line indicates the time series under the original balanced growth
path; the blue line represents the immigration experiment. See text for details.
productivity of the native-born, fnat, remaining unchanged in the experiment. Instead, the fall
is due to the general equilibrium effect on the real interest rate.
Specifically, the increase in high-skilled immigration endogenously increases economic growth.
This is evidenced in the middle row of Figure 3. During the first 30 years of transition, the growth
rate of ideas and consumption are higher than under the original BGP (both variables are nor-
malized to one in 1980). Because the representative household has concave preferences, it desires
to smooth consumption intertemporally and transfer some of the additional future consumption
growth forward in time. Obviously, this reallocation of consumption is not possible in equilib-
rium (of our closed economy model). This necessitates an increase in the real interest rate or
return to saving, as displayed in the bottom-left panel of Figure 3.
The increase in the interest rate, in turn, affects the equilibrium return to innovation. Recall
that the payoff to innovation, displayed in the bottom-right panel, is the present value of the
future profit stream accruing to the generated ideas. This is summarized by equation (23), which
we reproduce here:
wMt = a
nat∗
t f
natnt
∞∑
i=1
[
pit+i∏i
j=1Rt+j
]
.
Higher real interest rates mean that future profits are discounted more heavily. All else equal,
sorting into innovation becomes more selective; the ability level at which high-skilled native-
born workers are indifferent between working in management and innovation must rise. Since
the high-skilled native-born workers did not experience a shock to their innovation productivity,
less of them sort into innovation (though, as stated above, the effective is quantitatively small).
The upper and middle rows of Figure 4 present the time series for managerial labor. As the
population of high-skilled, foreign-born workers increases, so too does the number of foreign-born
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Figure 3: High-Skilled Immigration Experiment
Notes: The red dashed line indicates the time series under the original balanced growth path; the blue line
represents the immigration experiment. See text for details.
managers.23 By 2010, this increase is quantitatively large. The number of native-born managers
also increases due to the change in occupational sorting described above, though again, this is
quantitatively small. As a result, total employment in the managerial occupation increases by
approximately 20% over the 30 year period, as displayed in the middle-left panel, due largely
to the foreign-born increase. As a result of this immigration-induced increase in the supply
of labor, the managerial wage rate falls relative to the original BGP. This is displayed in the
middle-right panel.
23Note that foreign-born managerial labor actually falls slightly in the very first period, relative to the original
BGP. This is due to the increased sorting into innovation.
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Figure 4: High-Skilled Immigration Experiment
Notes: The red dashed line indicates the time series under the original balanced growth path; the blue line
represents the immigration experiment. See text for details.
The bottom row of Figure 4 present the time series for routine labor. Though the effect
is quantitatively small, increased high-skilled immigration, has the effect of increasing employ-
ment in routine occupations. That is, during the 1980 to 2010 transition period of our model’s
experiment, high-skilled immigration has not been responsible for a decrease in routine employ-
ment among the native-born. And as indicated in the bottom-right panel, the increase in the
high-skilled foreign-born workforce has not led to a fall in the wage earned by routine workers.
Because the quantitative effect is small, we plot this as a log deviation from the original BGP.
Nonetheless, the result of the immigration experiment is to increase the marginal product of
routine labor.
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Figure 5: High-Skilled Immigration Experiment
Notes: The red dashed line indicates the time series under the original balanced growth path; the blue line
represents the immigration experiment. See text for details.
To understand this, note that an increase in high-skilled immigrants has two effects on the
demand for routine labor. First, because of the increase in the number of innovators, there
is an increase in the growth rate of ideas and an increase in the accumulation of automation
technology. Because automation technology and routine labor are substitutes in production,
this lowers routine labor demand, as derived in equation (12). However, high-skilled immigrants
also work as managers. Though the foreign-born sort more intensively into innovation relative
to the native-born, the majority are employed in managerial occupations. Hence, the increase
in immigration increases managerial labor. Because managerial labor and routine tasks—and,
therefore, routine labor—are complements in production, this raises routine labor demand. This
complementarity effect dominates the substitution effect, resulting in an equilibrium increase in
employment and wages in routine occupations.
As a result, the model predicts that increased high-skilled immigration has led to a narrowing
of inequality between low- and high-skilled workers. This is displayed in Figure 5. The upper-left
panel plots the ratio of wages between routine and managerial labor; this has been normalized
so that its value in the original BGP is one. Evidently, increased immigration causes this ratio
to rise, shrinking the wage gap between routine workers and managers.
As an alternative measure of inequality, the upper-right panel displays the ratio of labor
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income earned by native-born routine workers to managers, specifically:
wRt
∫∞
u∗t
u dΥ(u)(1− φ)
wMtφshit
. (30)
This differs from the ratio of wages, wRt/wMt, in that it accounts for changes in routine and
managerial employment among the native-born, via changes in occupational sorting.24 While
this statistic is conceptually different, it generates decreasing inequality that is quantitatively
very similar to that observed in the wage gap.25
The lower-left panel displays the ratio of labor income earned by all low-skilled workers
to native-born managers. That is, it adds the income earned by service occupation workers
to the numerator of equation (30). Relative to (30), this provides greater scope for worsened
relative outcomes for the low-skilled, as employment gains in routine occupations come out of
employment in the service occupation. Nonetheless, the change in this statistic is quantitatively
very similar to those discussed above. Finally, the bottom-right panel displays the share of
total income accruing to low-skilled (native-born) labor. Between 1980 and 2010, this falls only
modestly by about 2 pp; this is primarily a mechanical result of the fact that total low-skilled
employment is constant while the experiment adds only high-skilled foreign-born workers over
time.
4.4 Further Analysis
In this section, we provide analytical results to illustrate that relative to the 1980 BGP, the
increase in high-skilled immigration has a quantitatively small effect on non-routine-biased tech-
nical change. As a result, early in the transition path to a new BGP, the substitution effect of
increased automation technology on the demand for routine labor is small.
To see this, consider equation (27) describing the equilibrium growth rate of ideas, where we
have used the fact that Γ(a) is a Pareto distribution with shape parameter κ:
gnt+1 = µ
natφfnatκ¯(anat∗t )
1−κ + µforfforκ¯(afor∗t )
1−κ,
where κ¯ ≡ κκ−1 . Taking a first-order, log-linear approximation to this equation obtains:
gˆn =
µnatφfnatκ¯(anat∗)1−κ
µnatφfnatκ¯(anat∗)1−κ + µforfforκ¯(afor∗)1−κ
[
µˆnat + φˆ+ fˆnat + (1− κ)aˆnat∗
]
+
µforfforκ¯(afor∗)1−κ
µnatφfnatκ¯(anat∗)1−κ + µforfforκ¯(afor∗)1−κ
[
µˆfor + fˆfor + (1− κ)aˆfor∗
]
. (31)
24In addition, increases in routine employment are drawn from the lower end of the skill distribution, Υ(u),
from workers who previously sorted into the service occupation.
25In the first two periods of the experiment, the income ratio falls relative to the original BGP; this is due
primarily to the larger increase manager employment relative to routine employment among the native-born.
However, as the transition progresses, this quickly reverses.
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In our immigration experiment, we leave the measure of high-skilled native-born workers and
native productivity unchanged (µˆnat = φˆ = fˆnat = 0). Moreover, as displayed in Figure 3,
occupational choice among the native-born hardly changes; this implies that the native cutoff
ability hardly changes (aˆnat∗ ≈ 0).
As such, we focus our attention on the second term in equation (31), and approximate it as:
gˆn ≈ µ
forffor(afor∗)1−κ
µnatφfnat(anat∗)1−κ + µforffor(afor∗)1−κ
[
µˆfor + fˆfor + (1− κ)aˆfor∗
]
. (32)
Under the Pareto distribution, (a∗)−κ is the fraction of high-skilled workers who sort into inno-
vation. Using this and equation (29), (32) becomes:
gˆn ≈ ϕ
[
µˆfor + fˆfor + (1− κ)aˆfor∗
]
, (33)
where:
ϕ ≡ µ
for(afor∗)−κ
µfor(afor∗)−κ + µnatφ(anat∗)−κ
.
Note that ϕ is simply the foreign-born share of innovators.
Calculated at 1980 BGP values, ϕ = 0.122. Hence, to a first-order log-linear approximation,
the impact of high-skilled immigration on the growth rate of ideas—that is, the pace of NBTC—
is small. For instance, suppose we were to consider an immediate doubling of the measure of
foreign-born workers in 1980 (i.e. µˆfor = 1); this is large given that it took 15 years for the
model economy to experience the same sized increase (as displayed in Figure 2). Using equation
(33), this would increase gn from the original BGP value of 2% to 2.224%.26 This illustrates
how, during the 1980 to 2010 period under consideration, the substitution effect of automation
technology growth on routine labor demand is dominated by the direct complementarity effect
of increased managerial labor supply, brought about by high-skilled immigration.
Note, however, that the relative importance of these substitution and complementarity effects
depends on the time horizon under consideration. The strength of each grows at a different rate
in our experiment. Consider the complementarity effect of managerial labor. In the long run,
the growth rate of managers is bounded above by the (constant) growth rate of high-skilled
immigration. By contrast, the substitution effect is governed by the stock of ideas. The growth
rate of ideas, displayed in equation (27), depends on the level of high-skilled labor, given our
Romer (1990)-style specification of technical change. Hence, the direct effect of immigration
implies that the growth rate of ideas and automation technology is increasing over time, so that
the relative strength of the two effects in the “very long run” is a quantitative question.
This is illustrated in Figure 6, where we plot the 90-year transition path of the immigration
experiment. Recall that the experiment involves growth of the high-skilled, foreign-born work-
force at a constant rate (which generates increasing idea growth, gn), leaving the growth rate of
26Of course, the accuracy of this log-linear approximation is compromised for such a large shock, µˆfor. Note
also that our experiment discussed in the previous two subsections also considered a positive shock, fˆfor > 0;
however, the equilibrium effect of this is to induce an offsetting fall, aˆfor∗ < 0. All things considered, the nature
of the result remains that the effect of immigration on NBTC is small.
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Figure 6: High-Skilled Immigration Experiment: Extended
Notes: The red dashed line indicates the time series under the original balanced growth path; the blue line
represents the immigration experiment. See text for details.
the other forms of technology (specifically, z and wS) constant. In the 90th period, immigration
stops and the growth rates of z and wS make a one-time increase to the endogenous value of g
n
so that the economy is forced to enter a new BGP.
As the top row of Figure 6 makes clear, the stock of ideas exhibits much greater growth
than the number of managers in the very long run. The substitution effect of automation
technology on routine labor demand can eventually dominate the complementarity effect of
increased managerial labor. The middle row displays routine employment and the routine wage.
Both display about 55 periods of growth during the experiment. However, they begin to decline
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in about 2035, cross below the values implied by the original BGP in about 2050, and fall
thereafter. The bottom row displays two measures of inequality between low- and high-skilled
workers. Consider, for instance, the routine-to-manager wage ratio. If high-skilled immigration
growth and NBTC were to continue as predicted by the model until 2070, this wage ratio would
be approximately one-third of its value in the 1980 BGP.
Hence, the impact of high-skilled immigration on polarization and wage inequality are evident
only in the very long run of this numerical exercise. There are many good reasons to question
the predictions from this experiment for outcomes 50 to 60 years hence. This is because of
the stark assumptions made in the analysis of the specific model experiment. For instance, the
experiment assumes constant growth of the high-skilled foreign-born population over 90 years,
at the substantial growth rates observed between 1980 and 2010. Future immigration policy is
obviously uncertain. In addition, and perhaps more controvertible, it assumes that the direction
of technical change via innovation remains non-routine-biased over the entire 90 year period.
That is, innovative activity augments automation technology leaving, for instance, the path of
labor-augmenting technology unchanged. While this may be a reasonable representation of the
job polarization period of the past 30 years, it may not remain the case for the next 60. Finally,
the model assumes Romer (1990)-style scale effects on the growth of non-routine-biased ideas.
Augmenting the model to diminish or eliminate these scale effects would weaken the long-run
substitution of automation technology for routine labor.
As such, we view the predictions of Figure 6 as uncertain and clearly representing a quanti-
tative theoretic upper bound of the effects of high-skilled immigration on increasing inequality.
In terms of the 1980–2010 experience, the model indicates that high-skilled immigration has, in
fact, reduced inequality.
5 Conclusion
In the last 30 to 40 years, immigration has constituted an important source of growth in high-
skilled employment, innovation, and productivity in the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. has
experienced technical change that is non-routine-biased, allowing technology to substitute for
labor in performing routine tasks, leading to job polarization and wage polarization in the labor
market.
In this paper, we study the role of high-skilled immigration in accounting for these changes
in the occupational-skill distribution and wage inequality. We do so in a general equilibrium
model featuring endogenous non-routine-biased technical change. We use this model to quantify
the impact of high-skilled immigration, and the increasing tendency of the foreign-born to work
in innovation, on the pace of technical change, the polarization of employment opportunities,
and the evolution of wage inequality since 1980. We find that high-skilled immigration has led
to a narrowing of inequality.
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